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The Public Nature of the Russian Build-Up

For anyone who follows Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) accounts on Twitter, you will have undoubtedly seen dozens, if not hundreds, of videos purportedly showing Battalion Tactical Groups (BTGs) of the Russian Ground Forces, loaded onto trains travelling west or located in assembly areas near the border with Ukraine. At the state level, various intelligence-gathering methods would provide a clear picture of what Russia is doing. Indeed, it appears that US intelligence sources have been very efficient, something we rarely see illustrated because of how close to the chest state-based intelligence is kept. But this very public mobilisation of a significant portion of the Russian Ground Forces is virtually unprecedented. Is this what military action in the age of smartphones will look like, or is this just a part of Putin’s plan against Ukraine?

There is no doubt that military mobilisation has always been a difficult secret to keep. People talk, and when you’re unexpectedly tasked with loading several BTGs worth of equipment onto trains, news of it will get out. This is especially true when reserves are called up as this is an uncommon event. Even in 1941, there were clues ahead of Operation Barbarossa and the attack on Pearl Harbour.

Communications technology is far more sophisticated today which makes it infinitely more difficult to hide military mobilisation measures. In the age of Web 2.0 and the smartphone, the ease of the instantaneous sharing of image and video content could simply make it impossible to confound intelligence-gathering methods; even in authoritarian states such as Russia.

What is far easier to hide in a modern military mobilisation are cyber assets. Cyber-attacks conducted by Russian assets are common, especially in Ukraine which has borne the brunt of such attacks since 2014. While the potential for damage from cyber-attacks is contested, there is no doubt that this grey-zone conflict will be an integral part of any Russian action against Ukraine. Several Ukrainian websites and banks have gone down over the past several weeks. Perhaps it is just a taste of what is to come for Ukrainians and the West.

Most of the released video content comes from Chinese-owned TikTok and is shared via Twitter or encrypted messaging platforms such as Russian renegade Pavel Durov’s Telegram. While Telegram’s nature makes it harder to restrict, TikTok is a platform that Russia could theoretically block access to if it wished, but yet it hasn’t. The Kremlin is clearly not that concerned about public videos of their mobilisation. For all we know, Russian intelligence is responsible for many of these videos.

But is this because Putin wants the build-up seen not just in the capitals of Europe and the US but also by the average person on the streets of Kyiv and other eastern European nations? The question of whether Russia invades is still open, but the public nature of this military build-up makes it appear part of a psychological operation (PSYOP) against Ukraine.

If so, Putin may have miscalculated. Despite some Russian sympathies in the government, Ukrainians by and large do not want to be dominated by Moscow again. Tens of thousands of people from all walks of life are preparing for an insurgency to ensure that any aggression will prove costly for Russia. This is perhaps best illustrated by the video of the 78-year-old grandmother training to fight the invasion.

Another sign that the public nature of the mobilisation is a calculated ploy is the recent claim by the Russian Ministry of Defence that Russian forces had concluded a previously unannounced exercise and were being sent back to their permanent homes. This news was accompanied by images showing equipment loaded onto trains, but its veracity has been questioned. The loaded trains depicted are believed to be in southern Crimea and would need to travel north – closer to the contested border – before turning east. There is no evidence, as yet, that the Russian units located near Belgorod or Kursk, the forces most likely to threaten Ukraine are demobilising.

Perhaps Putin never intended to invade, and all this video content is part of his bluff. He doesn’t attempt to hide the mobilisation in the hopes that governments and citizens get scared and acquiesce to Russian demands with little to no cost to themselves but, there seems precious little evidence of that happening. Instead, resolve is hardening against Russia. Ukraine is closer to the US and the EU than it has been since its formation in 1991, and the West is likely to continue arming and training Ukraine making future action ever more costly for Russia. The Ukrainian door is rapidly closing for Russia; if they do not act soon, it will be too late.

By Justin|2024-04-29T15:06:18+10:00February 18, 2022|Opinion|0 Comments

The Case Against Acquiring the B-21

Several recent articles published in ASPI’s The Strategist have advocated for Australia to join the B-21 bomber program. But even if we get US Congressional approval, is the B-21 the answer to our lack of a long-range strike option?

The B-21 is still on track to achieve an average procurement price per unit of US$550 million in 2010 dollars. Adjusted for inflation, that increases to roughly US$700 million. Even if Australia could purchase several aircraft for the same price, it would still cost close to a billion Australian dollars apiece to acquire, and we would need to buy a number of them. ASPI’s Marcus Hellyer suggested Australia could buy a squadron of 12 to allow for a reasonable sortie rate. The easy math suggests this would cost Australia $12 billion, but that is just the cost of acquisition.

All aircraft require constant and expensive maintenance, and we must also account for potential war losses if an enemy’s A2/AD envelope is more effective than anticipated. The US Department of Defence expects sustainment costs for the B-21 to equal US$114 billion for a 100-airframe fleet over an expected 30-year life cycle. If that figure holds, that is a sustainment cost to Australia of almost $20 billion over 30 years for a total acquisition cost of $32 billion in 2022 dollars. That is a lot for a fleet of 12 aircraft.

In the same article linked above, Marcus Hellyer suggested that two flights of three B-21s could sortie per day each carrying 10 missiles. This would presumably be the AGM-158C long-range anti-ship missile. Australia is in the process of acquiring a number of these weapons for an undisclosed price per unit, but this could be $5 million or more per missile. Each sortie could cost tens of millions for the weapons alone. Australia has only committed to buying $800 million worth of missiles and associated equipment so far. At a reasonable sortie rate against a well-defended adversary, we would expend our stock in days. If a war with China were to last beyond that, we would have an extremely expensive capability that was unable to deliver much of anything in defence of Australia.

China has rapidly improved its A2/AD capability, and in the event of a conflict, would seek to increase that envelope as far from its coast as possible. Chinese warships like the Type 055 feature a large number of vertical launch cells providing them with the capability to shoot down swarms of incoming missiles. And with the F-35’s limited range, the B-21 would need to rely on its stealth to get close enough to strike targets in the South China Sea. If that stealth can be countered in some way, they could be vulnerable to counter-fire by active radar or heat-seeking missiles.

The protection of our maritime approaches is what the RAAF and RAN should primarily focus on. Does it make sense to spend over $30 billion on a capability that could expend its primary weapons in days and is designed to penetrate deep into enemy territory on long-range missions?

The first five B-21s are currently under construction with the first expected to be rolled out to the public later this year. The first flight is expected several months later, perhaps late this year or sometime in 2023. For its predecessor, the B-2, public rollout took place in November 1988, first flight in July 1989 and the first delivery in December 1993. If Northrop Grumman can match this same schedule, the first production B-21s won’t be delivered to the US Air Force until around 2026 or 2027.

Australia would likely need to wait longer before the first B-21s were delivered as the US would seek to build up its fleet before commencing deliveries to a customer. If Australia were able to buy into the B-21 program, it could very well be another weapons system that won’t see service in the Australian Defence Force until deep into the 2030s.

Australia has not operated any type of bomber since the retirement of the F-111 fleet in 2010, and you can argue that Australia hasn’t operated a true long-range bomber for decades. There is a lot of institutional knowledge that does not exist in the RAAF today. Our pilots spent several years learning to operate the F-35, how long would it take us to turn the B-21 into an effective weapon? Could the B-21 be operational in the RAAF before 2035?

The B-21 represents the pinnacle of what Australia has sought to acquire this century, the best possible option seemingly regardless of cost. It is also difficult to trust the government’s acquisition process given the collapse of the Attack-class program and the recent Hunter-class issues. Defence has a wine taste on a beer budget and perhaps it is time for a change. Instead of pinning our hopes on a world-class capability that won’t arrive for years, we should ensure that Australia has the weapons to meet the threats we face today and in the near future.

By Justin|2024-04-29T15:09:35+10:00February 8, 2022|Opinion|0 Comments

A primer on the possible Russian invasion of Ukraine

A lot has been said in the press and among national security folks about the threat to Ukraine by Russia. It occurs to me that many people know little about the threat that Ukraine faces from its bellicose eastern neighbour.

To me, there is a gap in the coverage of events as articles are written by either journalists or policy wonks. The journalists, in their rush to feed the beast, lack the time to do much beyond the here and now. And the wonks write things that are only understandable by other wonks and dedicated amateurs, assuming too much prior knowledge along the way.

Either way, for those who don’t have the time or inclination to closely follow current events, it is easy to get lost in a sea of news coverage. So today, I am bringing you this primer on the current conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

Three weeks ago, I wrote that while the threat from Russia was real, it seemed doubtful they would invade Ukraine based on Putin’s style of measured foreign policy. But the buildup has continued, followed by this tweet from CNN reporter Natasha Bertrand.

Confirming @Reuters: The US has seen indications that Russia has positioned supplies of blood near Ukraine’s borders, according to a senior US defense official. Ukraine denies. WH official says Ukraine is “downplaying” the threat. with @OrenCNN @mchancecnn https://t.co/yHnXYs5f6R

— Natasha Bertrand (@NatashaBertrand) January 29, 2022

Up until recently, Russia had been moving large amounts of equipment along the border with Ukraine, but with recent reports of medical supplies including field hospitals and the aforementioned supplies of blood entering the theatre, this is getting more serious, more real. You don’t bring up supplies of perishable medical supplies unless you believe they will be required.

There is a lot of information flying around, so I thought I would help condense it so people can understand what may happen and what is at stake.

Why would Russia attack Ukraine?

Russia does not want any further expansion of NATO into any more former Soviet states. For the same reason that China props up the North Korean regime, Russia wants to limit the number of US close allies right on its border. There is also significant distrust on both sides. It is unlikely that Putin will believe any pronouncements about future Ukrainian membership into the EU or NATO. Putin believes that Russia has already been betrayed with the admission of former communist states like Poland, Romania and the Baltic states. This is a heavily disputed fact in the west, but Putin believes it, so it may as well be true.

He also wants to bring Ukraine into the Russian sphere of influence. Putin has achieved this with Belarus, Armenia and most recently with Kazakhstan and wants to arrest Ukraine’s move toward closer ties with the west. There is also no doubt that Putin laments the fall of Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union and, while he does not openly wish to rebuild the USSR, he does want to restore Russia’s global power and prestige, and Ukraine is the next step towards that goal.

Putin would also seek to cement Russian control over the Crimean peninsula. Annexed in 2014, the region is still acknowledged as belonging to Ukraine by the international community. He would seek to force a settlement that formally grants Crimea to Russia.

The Ukrainian region of Donbas is also a thorn in his side. Russia chose not to annex this region, and pro-Russian voters would help maintain Russian control over a future Ukrainian government, so it is likely that he would reintegrate the Donbas region back into Ukraine.

Putin knows that he will not get his way on any of these points if he has to negotiate with the US, so a military confrontation with Ukraine is the only way to satisfy all these objectives. A quick thrust into Ukraine should force the government to the table where the Russians can dictate terms. The current Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelensky is also deeply unpopular with an approval rating in the 30s. His government could topple early on, and the Russians would seek to install a friendly government that would accept whatever Putin demanded.

There is another reason that has been floated by analysts. At the moment, to enter Crimea, you have to travel by bridge, sea or air; the only land corridor is through Ukrainian territory. They may drive from the Rostov region through Mariupol and along the coast to establish a land corridor with the Russian-controlled Crimean town of Armiansk. That way, Russia can bypass the vulnerable Kerch Strait (1) if required. There has been little equipment moved into Crimea since November, though there have been some recent developments. I don’t know how likely a northern thrust from Crimea is. Russian forces may wish to simply hold the peninsula until reinforcements can arrive from Rostov rather than go on the offensive.

Russian Strategy and Outcomes

So if Russia does pull the trigger so to speak, what is their likely strategy and what are the potential outcomes?

First, they will need an excuse to launch their invasion. Most likely, the Russians will manufacture an attack by Ukraine. It is a classic tactic. Germany used a faked attack on a radio station as a pretext to invade Poland in September 1939, and the Soviets used the shelling of a town as a pretext to launch the Winter War with Finland a couple of months later. There is a more recent Russian precedent as well. In 1999, a series of apartment bombings were used as justification to launch the Second Chechen War. So expect any Russian attack to be preceded by a convenient attack by Ukrainian forces.

Justification in hand, the attack can begin. But will that mean troops crossing the border? Probably not at first. It will probably start with rockets, missiles and artillery. And just like the Gulf War in 1991, Russia will seek to gain air superiority and use it to bomb Ukrainian defensive positions and command & control centres. Also, expect attacks from UAVs and perhaps the first wide-scale use of cyberattacks to hinder Ukrainian communication between its government, its armed forces and the civilian population.

The ground stage is likely to come next, but we don’t know where it will come from. There are four possible options.

First, an attack south from Belarus (1) on either side of the Dnieper River towards the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv. Second, an attack from the northeast from Bryansk (2), Kursk (3) and Belgorod (4). Third, from the Rostov region (5) into eastern Ukraine and potentially towards Crimea. And finally from the south in Crimea (6).

It is also possible that Russian troops may attempt to seize the Ukrainian port cities of Odesa (1) or Mariupol (2) via the sea or air. The Russians have recently moved some amphibious forces into the Black Sea, so this may either be part of the initial advance or as a means to draw the attention of Ukrainian forces after the initial invasion.

So are Russia aiming to annex Ukraine? Almost certainly not. Russia will most likely stop once it reaches the Dnieper River except for a couple of possible outcomes. First, they may wish to encircle the Ukrainian capital city of Kyiv or the aforementioned capture of Odesa. But geography plays a big part here. To the east of the Dnieper River—indicated by the red line in the below image—is relatively open country, perfect for large armoured formations. To the west are dense forests and mountainous terrain.

As part of their buildup, the Russians have mobilised bridging equipment. This could be for a variety of reasons. Russia may intend to breach the Dnieper, or at least think it may be a possibility. The mobilisation of all this equipment has not been done in secret. Ukraine knows it’s there and, Russia may hope that it holds some of its forces in reserve near Odesa or along the Dnieper in case the Russians use it. If they do, it makes a breakthrough along the Ukrainian frontier easier for Russia. As can be seen in the above image, the Dnieper is a very wide river in places, and Russian troops would be vulnerable to Ukrainian artillery if they attempted to cross.

Before a ground invasion begins, special forces will be deployed to organise pro-Russian separatists into open rebellion in the hope that the cities will already be in Russian hands by the time the army arrives. That way, they only need to enforce order and eliminate any resistance and can avoid wholesale destruction of Ukraine’s cities and tremendous loss of life.

Once they reach the Dnieper, it is unlikely they will progress further, but they may wish to encircle Kyiv to enforce a favourable settlement as the Germans did in France in 1871. This is potentially where the Russian client state of Belarus comes in. Major roads link the two countries on both sides of the Dnieper, and Kyiv is only 250 miles away from the border. Flanking attacks destined for Kyiv can take place on both sides of the Dnieper, as well as from Bryansk or Kursk.

The region is densely wooded in places, but its proximity and the quality of the roads means that a Russian armoured attack from this direction could make ground very rapidly.

If Russia successfully captures the eastern half of the country up to the Dnieper and encircles Kyiv, Ukraine would be forced to capitulate. Most of the Ukrainian export industry is located in the east. The Ukrainian economy would quickly collapse with such a dramatic loss. There will also be a refugee crisis as Ukrainians flee from the approaching Russian forces placing even more burden on Zelensky or whoever takes his place. Once Putin has the Ukrainians at the table, he would seek to cement his control over the government with a power-sharing arrangement. For example, a pro-Ukrainian PM from the west and a pro-Russian President from the east.

Despite their superiority in arms, there are risks for the Russians. Excluding the weather which I speak of below, militias are forming throughout the country vowing to fight a Russian invasion till the last. This is not without difficulty though. Previous Ukrainian dissident movements have originated in the west where the terrain is more defensible, and the plains of eastern Ukraine are ill-suited for an insurgency. They may be able to slow the Russian advance enough that they fail to reach their objectives before the spring thaw.

When could Russia attack?

Ukraine is in the depths of winter right now, and from what has been seen in eastern Ukraine and Russia, the ground is frozen solid, but these conditions will not last. From what I understand, the spring thaw in late March will turn much of the region into an impassable mush. Russia will need to ensure that it launches the attack with enough time to meet its objectives before the spring thaw.

News of blood supplies means they are not far away from being ready, but there is another factor that may delay the attack, the Winter Olympics that begins on Friday. With the west isolating Russia, Putin has turned to China and President Xi. They are logical partners; their foes are the same, and they have little in the way of overlapping interests. It is unlikely that Xi would want the Olympics interrupted, so any invasion is unlikely to begin before the 20th.

Russia also has military exercises scheduled with Belarus from the 10th to the 20th of February. This is not to say that D-Day for the invasion is the 20th. The Belarusian exercises are likely a pretext to move large numbers of Russian troops and equipment into the country for a potential drive south to Kyiv or a feint, so Ukraine spreads its forces ever thinner.

Leaving it this late does not leave a lot of time. The Russian armed forces have worked hard to fix their deficiencies, and with so many avenues to attack, the Ukrainians are going to be stretched. Ukraine is outmatched and has little hope of halting a Russian advance. And if pro-Russian separatists can take control of key cities, the Russian army could make rapid progress. They would have around six weeks. Is it enough time? We will have to wait and see.

There is still time for both sides to come up with some sort of a face-saving agreement, but time is fast running out.

Maps courtesy of Google, featured image from YouTube.

By Justin|2024-04-29T15:11:10+10:00January 30, 2022|Opinion|0 Comments

Russia, Ukraine and the threat of war

There has been a lot of recent discussions about Russia and Ukraine. Putin is at it yet again, and as usual, the West is being predictably meek in return. But will Russia take the next step and actually invade Ukraine? It seems doubtful considering how comparatively ‘measured’ Putin has been since 2008. He has favoured backroom deals and the use of proxies when force is required, and he learned the hard way the cost of strategic miscalculation in Chechnya. Most likely, Putin is trying to win concessions from the West, the tacit acceptance of a Russian ‘sphere of influence’. It appears he is playing a dangerous game but is he?

I want to say that one day the West will wake up and do more to defend democracies from authoritarian regimes but, any parallels between today and the policy of Hitlerian appeasement are slim at best. Ukraine is not Poland, and this is not 1939. England and France declared war because they knew Hitler would inevitably invade western Europe. It was in their self-interest, and a matter of survival but we’re not anywhere close to that with Russia.

At this stage, it appears Putin’s strategy is to wipe away the stain left by the collapse of the Soviet Union, to recover what was lost and give Russia the means to be a truly global player again. And as long as he doesn’t threaten NATO members, I do not see the West reacting beyond more words and sanctions, but this will only embolden Putin, as it did Hitler. The only way to defeat a bully is to stand up to him, even at the risk of a black eye or bloody nose.

The spectre of nuclear weapons is probably a core reason for Western timidity. The fear that any conventional war will not end that way is ever-present, but I do not necessarily believe that is the case. If we end up in a shooting war with China or Russia, as long as we don’t threaten their survival, I believe they will show restraint. So as long as we didn’t invade Russia in some attempt at regime change, a conventional war should remain that. But then you run the risk of engaging in an open-ended conflict with no clear goal save for removing Russia from Ukrainian soil and the establishment of a stable democratic government. Boy have we been on that merry-go-round before with the same results.

I am not advocating war with Russia, but at what point do we stop paying lip service to democracy and human rights and do something meaningful? I understand the potential costs are high. Most people are not interested in the blood and treasure required to save Ukraine from the Russian boot, but if we had spent some treasure on Ukraine years ago, we would not be in this situation now. Ukraine would have been better prepared to repel Russian advances in Crimea and the Donbas. The less we do today, the more will be required tomorrow, so why waste time in the vain hope that Putin will suddenly wake up and decide to be Mr Democracy?

We cannot gamble on waiting Putin out in the hopes that his successor will be any better. The demise of Putin is unlikely to lead to some kind of democratic reawakening for those in power. No, they will support whoever will secure and grow their fortunes. The best time to support Ukraine was in 2014; the second-best time is now.

Featured image courtesy of Mstyslav Chernov.

By Justin|2024-04-29T15:13:34+10:00January 9, 2022|Opinion|0 Comments

US Moral Decay

When Scott Morrison, Joe Biden and Boris Johnson fronted up to a somewhat awkward press conference to announce AUKUS, Australia firmly and irrevocably hitched its wagon to the United States. As ASPIs Marcus Hellyer said in a recent article, ‘If there was any doubt about what Australia would do in the event of armed conflict between the US and China over Taiwan or the South China Sea, that’s now gone. The US doesn’t provide you with the crown jewels of its military technology if you are not going to use them when it calls for help’. But who is it that we have bound our fortunes to?

The societal issues of the United States are well documented at this point. Trump’s 2016 election victory emboldened the far right and led to a rise in hate crimes. There was a car attack in Charlottesville that killed a woman. The George Floyd murder and the subsequent trial of the officers involved and the summer of riots and civil disturbances that resulted.

The age of Trump culminated with the events of January 6, 2021, when the President and his allies seemingly encouraged a mob to storm the US Capitol Building in an attempt to overturn an election. The Republican Party has been taken over by unserious people like congresswoman Marjorie Taylor Greene and author cum politician J. D. Vance.

But US moral decay is not only an epidemic of the right.

The US media is quick to assign racism when the perpetrator is white even in the complete absence of evidence.

There has been a horrific rise in anti-Semitic hate crimes during and since the recent Israel-Palestine conflict.

And where was the moral outrage when African American Republican candidate for Governor Larry Elder was attacked by a woman wearing a gorilla mask? If this woman was wearing a MAGA hat and the victim was a Democrat, I can guarantee that the coverage would have been very different.

Whataboutism reached new heights in the past week with a video released of activists pursuing Arizona Democratic Senator Krysten Sinema into a bathroom to confront her after she declined to speak with them. As noted Never-Trumper Tom Nichols said, ‘Once you agree it’s acceptable to physically intimidate officials who won’t do what you want, the difference between January 6 and the Sinema escapade is one of *scale*, not *kind*’.

Afghanistan was another sorry chapter in US foreign policy. Its ignominious withdrawal from the country left behind many who had aided them to the tender mercies of the Taliban. And it seems their attitudes towards women have not changed. It was clear to everyone what was going to happen, but President Biden was adamant that the US be out by the 20th anniversary of September 11 whether it was prudent or not.

These are the people we are binding ourselves to. These are the people who will demand our help for giving us the keys to the cookie jar.

Many people, including me, were apprehensive about US long-term engagement in Asia. A nation of unserious people with no appetite for enforcing the liberal world order they created does not make for a dependable ally. However, this concern was seemingly blown away with the AUKUS announcement and Joe Biden has largely continued with his predecessor’s strategy to contain China. But despite AUKUS, that worry in the back of my mind endures. China is continuing to apply pressure on Taiwan. If war breaks out, can Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, India, Indonesia, and Australia rely on the US to act?

I want to say yes, but politicians are so beholden to the present that I am concerned that the US will put up no more fight than it did for Ukraine in its fight against Russia. And let us not forget that we are not the only country in the crosshairs of France over AUKUS; France also recalled its ambassador to the United States. If you ask the French, they would say this is the latest in a string of slights as the US foreign establishment has turned its focus on Asia.

Now don’t get me wrong. The decision to build nuclear-powered submarines is long overdue and the correct decision given our strategic fragility. And as John J. Mearsheimer has argued, China and the United States were always going to force us to choose between them. And in the end, Australia was always going to side with the West because what other choice did we have? China has interfered in our politics, stolen the intellectual property of our companies and institutions and, held us to ransom for daring to lend our support to an inquiry on the origins of COVID-19. None of this is conducive to long-term peace and stability between nation-states.

Chinese President Xi Jinping’s ‘wolf warrior’ diplomacy has pushed us even deeper into the corner of the United States. Xi’s actions turned the tide of public opinion and brought about something that a few years ago seemed impossible; nuclear propulsion for Australia. But Australia must remain vigilant and ensure that we don’t compromise on our sovereignty.

By Justin|2024-04-29T15:17:27+10:00October 6, 2021|Opinion|0 Comments

Nuclear Submarine Disposal

The year is 2075, and it is a bright and beautiful sunny day in Sydney. The assembled masses prepare for the decommissioning ceremony for Australia’s first nuclear-powered submarine. A band plays a hearty tune, and past and present members of the boat’s company farewell what had been a game-changer for the nation’s silent service.

After the ceremony, many meet up at local pubs to share stories of their adventures aboard the boat. But back at the dock, the Royal Australian Navy faces a dilemma. Unlike the diesel-electric boats of the past that were broken up or sunk as artificial reefs, the inevitable disposal of this particular submarine has been causing headaches for years.

The Royal Navy has struggled to dispose of its nuclear-powered boats dating back to the 1970s. For example, its first nuclear boat, HMS Dreadnought, is still tied up alongside at Rosyth awaiting dismantling or preservation despite its decommissioning in 1980. That was 41 years ago. At least seven of these boats have been in this sort of post-life limbo for longer than they were in active service.

In total, the Royal Navy has 20 submarines awaiting their fate under the MOD’s Submarine Dismantling Project. This backlog will inevitably increase as the newer Astutes and Dreadnoughts replace the Trafalgar’s and Vanguards in the coming decade. It will take many years for the MOD to complete the disposal of all these old boats.

It is expensive to dispose of these vessels, and defueling a nuclear-powered submarine is only part of the problem. While this is the most critical part of a nuclear boat’s disposal, radiation contamination remains in the surrounding spaces. Approximately 5% of the vessel’s mass is comprised of low and intermediate-level nuclear waste and a further 5% as non-radioactive, but still hazardous waste. This leaves 90% as items, mostly steel, that can be safely broken up and recycled.

The seven boats in Rosyth, Scotland have all had their nuclear fuel removed, but of the 13 boats tied up at the Royal Navy’s other storage facility in Devonport, nine were still fuelled as of 2018. The oldest, HMS Splendid, left the fleet in 2004. It is a critical and ongoing problem for the Royal Navy. Because the problem gets kicked down the road by successive governments, the total cost to dispose of these relics of the past continues to grow. Estimates suggest that it will cost over £10 billion by the time the project is completed sometime in the 2040s. That could have bought an additional Dreadnought-class SSBN and another Astute, or perhaps even another Queen Elizabeth-class carrier and a couple of Type 26 frigates. Needless to say, with tightening defence budgets in the UK, £10 billion could have been far better spent elsewhere.

Submarine disposal is a problem that is largely confined to the UK. The United States, Russia, and France have all safely and successfully disposed of decommissioned nuclear-powered vessels. The Royal Navy did not help itself when the submarines were designed so their Reactor Pressure Vessels could be removed. For example, the United States simply cuts out the entire section containing radioactive components for transfer to land-based storage facilities. This has allowed the United States to dispose of over 130 vessels equipped with nuclear reactors since the 1980s. It is unclear if the MOD considered this as an easier and faster method to dispose of these boats.

Finally, the MOD has not included the safe disposal of the Astutes and Dreadnoughts in the Submarine Dismantling Project despite the fact it is still likely to be running when the first Astutes are decommissioned. It appears the idea of kicking the problem down the road is alive and well in London.

Political decisions are often judged by the needs of the present. ‘Let that be the next person’s problem’ is a mantra that is so ingrained in capitals around the world as to be almost gospel. But while we forge ahead into this new era of ADF capability, I hope that the government and Defence Department give due thought to what will come after, rather than leaving it as an expensive headache for future generations.

By Justin|2024-04-29T15:21:14+10:00September 17, 2021|Opinion|0 Comments

Of course the US and China are not destined for war

I am an avid reader of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s online publication, The Strategist. Most days, they release articles from a variety of authors on issues related to current events and items of strategic interest. Today, they posted an article by General Charles C. Krulak, USMC, Retired and Alex Friedman, former CFO at the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation titled ‘The US and China are not destined for war’.

It was an interesting, if obvious article that despite the predictions of war between these two great powers, it is not a forgone conclusion. The article mentions Graham Allison’s ‘Thucydides Trap’ discussed in his book Destined for War: Can America and China escape Thucydides’ Trap?. The basic idea is that when a great power meets a rising power, most times throughout human history, such clashes have ended in war. It can be read as alarmist in nature, but the whole point about defence and foreign policy thinkers is not necessarily to solve the issues of today, but to predict what could happen tomorrow. Before World War 2, the US military had secret war plans for any number of possibilities. Not merely for the obvious targets Germany or Japan, but also Great Britain. It’s called War Plan Red if you’re interested. You must be prepared for any eventuality, lest you be caught wrong footed when a crisis hits.

And there is no doubt that China has grown increasingly belligerent. Despite a momentary hiccup due to COVID-19, China appears to be powering ahead while the Western democracies continue to be mired in pandering to the political extremes of their populations and making a mess of pandemic response. China can build a skyscraper or a bridge in days, meanwhile it can take us literally years to accomplish the same task. China has been caught red-handed buying political influence in Australia and militarising their artificial islands in the Spratly and Paracel Islands. They are not a benign threat.

Do I think that the US and China will go to war? No, almost certainly not. For reasons mentioned in the article, China plays a long game and will not seek to risk all that they have gained by acting hasty. But at the same time, it is possible. How many wars have begun by miscalculation or mistake? Not all wars are launched through malevolent intent. And we need people like Graham Allison to see where the potential hot spots are so that we can prepare for them. It is the only prudent and responsible thing to do.

By Justin|2024-04-29T15:23:21+10:00August 24, 2021|Opinion|0 Comments

Afghanistan and the role of the United States in a bipolar world

As we all watch scenes of chaos unfold in Afghanistan, I can imagine that there are a great many people in China greedily rubbing their hands together over the whole affair. Once again, the United States has left an ally hanging. It is more evidence that the United States is an unreliable and alarmingly unpredictable ally. That ultimately, US foreign policy is at the mercy of a wilfully misinformed American public. As Tom Nichols said in a recent article for The Atlantic:

Americans will now exercise their usual partisan outrage for a few weeks, and then Afghanistan, like everything else in a nation with an attention span not much longer than a fast-food commercial, will be forgotten. In the meantime, American citizens will separate into their usual camps and identify all of the obvious causes and culprits except for one: themselves.

I remember being utterly shocked at the images of people falling to their deaths out of the World Trade Centre towers on September 11, and the world could only watch on as a similar tragedy unfolded over the past few days. Most people accept that we have entered a new era of great power competition. But how can America’s allies have any faith that they will act to meet a common threat when this is how they treat an ally? How can anyone trust that US politicians will do the right thing, even against opposition at home? The days of Presidents like Eisenhower or Truman, people with the fortitude to do what needed to be done are long gone.

The fact is that the United States is untrustworthy. Perhaps the American people will once again wake up and accept their place in the world. Who knows? But can we honestly trust the common sense of a people who, with many months of widespread access to vaccines, still has barely 50% of its population fully vaccinated against COVID-19? Such is the spread of misinformation and distrust in their government.

For Australia, there is no choice. We must remain closely allied with the United States. We have seen all too well what happens when the CCP turns its gaze upon you. However, our obsession with interoperability must end. We are building an expensive – perhaps too expensive – boutique defence force that might well work as part of an allied coalition against a country barely able to defend itself but is almost completely incapable of defending Australia. It is called the Australian Defence Force after all. If the fundamental mission of the ADF is to defend this country, and it cannot now, nor into the future, then what benefit are we deriving from spending vast sums of money?

Why are we replacing modern M1 Abrams tanks with a slightly newer variant of the Abrams? Why are we swapping one armed reconnaissance helicopter for another? What is the point of investing all this money in the Australian Army for the defence of Australia? If a foreign invader were ever to gain a foothold on our shores, we could never hope to push them back into the sea. Our island is vast. Could we ever hope to promptly bring sufficient force to bear on an invader? I believe that is debatable. There is insufficient infrastructure investment in Australia’s north. If an invasion of our island is thwarted, it will be because of the Navy and Air Force, not the Army.

This whole episode reminds me of Hugh White’s book Defending Australia. I am not advocating his plan to rebuild the ADF, but a new direction is required. It is clear that the same old way of thinking that has served us since the 1970s is no longer to our strategic benefit. We now live in a world that Australia has not faced since the 1940s, a powerful Asian threat. That is what initiated our pivot to the United States; Australia recognised that the British Empire was incapable of protecting us. Can we afford to cling to alliances that may fall apart when the conflict starts to the exclusion of all else? A strategic change of this magnitude takes at least a generation to complete. Can we afford to wait any longer? I’ll end with the words of Winston Churchill:

I have, myself, full confidence that if all do their duty, if nothing is neglected, and if the best arrangements are made, as they are being made, we shall prove ourselves once again able to defend our Island home, to ride out the storm of war, and to outlive the menace of tyranny, if necessary for years, if necessary alone.

By Justin|2024-04-29T15:26:03+10:00August 19, 2021|Opinion|0 Comments

Folly in Compulsory Voting?

Australia has compulsory voting for elections at all levels of government. But should it? For a long time, I felt we should not, but I’ve come to change my mind. There are many valid arguments for and against compulsory voting, so why do I support it?

One of the most ridiculous arguments against compulsory voting is that it is a step towards totalitarianism. Countries like Australia are not like Nazi Germany. After the 1938 Anschluss with Germany, the Nazis held a referendum in Austria over the issue. The ballot paper featured a large circle to approve of the Anschluss, and a small circle to vote no. It’s a not-so-subtle hint. Finally, you had to vote in front of campaign workers to ensure that you voted the correct way. The result was 99.71% voter turnout with ‘yes’ winning 99.73% of the vote.

In Australia, you line up, and give your name to the poll worker who ticks you off the roll. You’re then given a ballot paper and head into a private booth to fill it out. Drop it in the secure box and you’re done. If you don’t like any of the candidates, you’re not forced to vote for anyone. You can draw penises on the ballot paper, and nothing will happen to you.

This leads to another common argument. Compulsory voting increases informal voting. The assumption is that if people are forced to vote, they are far more likely to spoil their vote by leaving it blank, defacing it or voting incorrectly. I will illustrate why I don’t believe this is the case with an example.

When a sitting member resigns from parliament in Australia, it causes a by-election. The winner of which takes that seat in parliament until the next election. These are often seen as an annoyance. Few like to vote at the best of times, but when you’re forced to vote out of turn, it is frustrating and a waste of a perfectly good Saturday. The worst of these is the by-election that takes place in a safe seat. The stakes are high if it is a hotly contested by-election, or if the government’s majority rests on the result. But when neither is the case, there is little enthusiasm.

This happened late last year in the federal division of Groom. In the 2019 federal election, the LNP candidate won Groom by 40 points, a clear victory. Of the 98,608 votes cast, 3160, or 3.2%, were informal, what Australians call spoiled ballots.

In the 2020 Groom by-election, the new LNP candidate won by 35 points, another clear victory. Surprisingly, of the 88,645 votes cast in the by-election, only 2,504 or 2.82% were informal. So, in a by-election with no drama over the winner, there were fewer informal votes than in the general election the year prior.

Now voter turnout for the Groom by-election was lower; 93.05% of those enrolled voted in 2019 versus 81.66% for the by-election. But reduced turnout doesn’t mean that the 11.39% who did not vote would have voted informally. It was a COVID year, and despite easy access to postal voting, a depressed turnout was likely.

But how do the informal voting figures from these two recent Australian elections compare to the United States? According to the US Election Administration and Voting Survey, total voter turnout in 2016 was 140,114,502. Of those, 33,378,450 voted absentee with 318,728 rejected – only 0.77%.

Now 3.2% is higher than 0.77% so you could argue that compulsory voting leads to higher numbers of informal votes. While this may be technically correct, it ignores the fact that greater voter turnout still gives a more representative result.

Just days before the 2016 Presidential election, total voter registration in the US stood at 200,081,377. This would have increased in the final weeks, but this is as good a number as any to illustrate the point. Based on the total voter turnout of 140,114,502, only 70.03% of people registered voted. By comparison, in the 2019 Australian federal election 91.89% of people voted.

While Trump’s win in 2016 wasn’t because of voter turnout, you can argue that compulsory voting might have changed the result.

Even the argument that voluntary voting makes parties try harder is false. All compulsory voting does is increase voter turnout. Parties still need to convince people to vote for them. Plus, it helps minor parties who don’t have wealthy backers to fund their campaigns.

While compulsory voting may do little to help voter apathy, at least it engages more people in the process. Voting is an essential part of citizenship. Choosing not to vote means you forfeit the right to complain when the government does something you disagree with.

There are simply no viable arguments against making voting compulsory. It isn’t the first step in totalitarianism. It isn’t infringing on your rights. It is ensuring that your voice is heard.

By Justin|2024-04-29T15:28:18+10:00March 22, 2021|Opinion|0 Comments

The Court of Inquiry Over Typhoon Cobra

In an earlier post, I detailed the events of December 1944 when Typhoon Cobra struck the Third Fleet. At the end, I said the tale of the investigation was a story for another time. Well, another time is today.

The Third Fleet arrived back at Ulithi on December 24 to regroup and repair. Within hours, Admiral Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific fleet, arrived at Ulithi. The following day, he sat down with Halsey and ordered a court of inquiry into the loss of the destroyers, and the damage sustained by the fleet. Typhoon Cobra had been one of the Navies greatest disasters, and they were determined to find out what went wrong. If required, the court of inquiry could recommend courts-martial for those who failed in the discharge of their duties. And no one within the Third Fleet’s chain of command would be safe, including Halsey.

The court of inquiry called all relevant officers to give evidence. This included the Chief Aerologist George Kosco, Task Force 38 commander John McCain, Task Group 38.2 commander Gerald Bogan as well as Halsey himself. Halsey would shift blame to the ‘non-existent’ weather warning systems of the Pacific. But two questions later, Halsey gave an answer that suggested he did receive at least some weather information. He would continue to maintain he had no warning of the storm’s approach.

Calling weather information hit or miss is an understatement. It was patchy and often inconsistent. But Halsey’s claims flew in the face of evidence provided by others in Third Fleet. It also contradicted his statements. On December 17, when the Spence was attempting to refuel from the New Jersey, Halsey believed that “we were on the fringes of a disturbance.” By the morning of the 18th, there was no doubt that a major storm was approaching, and he had to act.

But he didn’t do anything. He failed to issue a simple advisory to the ships under his command that the storm was much closer than previously thought. Halsey was in his early 60s and an experienced naval officer. In contrast, Henry Plage, in command of the USS Tabberer, was only 29. Halsey did not take into account that those under him were less experienced and in much smaller ships.

Ultimately, the court of inquiry found that Halsey was accountable for “errors of judgment”. He was “at fault in not broadcasting definite danger warnings to all vessels early morning of December 18 in order that preparations might be made as practicable and that inexperienced commanding officers might have sooner realized the seriousness of their situations.”

Sounds damning, and at least in my opinion, worthy of a charge of dereliction of duty. The court of inquiry found Halsey accountable, but instead of recommending charges, the court said that Halsey’s failure to act was due to the stress of war operations and were not offences.

Admiral Nimitz approved of the court’s findings and softened the indictment against Halsey by stating his firm opinion “that no question of negligence is involved.” He affirmed that Halsey’s errors of judgment were “committed under the stress of war operations” and were born “from a commendable desire to meet military commitments.”

Any condemnation by Admiral Nimitz was blamed on the Fleet’s over-reliance on new technologies rather than trusting their instincts. Nimitz found fault with both commanders and aerologists who placed too high importance on weather reports and other outside sources of information. Nimitz lectured “for a revival of the age-old habits of self-reliance and caution in regard to the hazard from storms, and for officers in all echelons of command to take their personal responsibilities in this respect more seriously.”

Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Ernest J. King softened the Navies indictment of Halsey further. He wrote “resulting from insufficient information” after “errors of judgment” and changed Nimitz’s “commendable desire” to “firm determination”.

Halsey was saved, and he knew it. It was too late in the war for the Navy to jettison its most famous Admiral. Whether this was the right thing or not is debatable. Halsey was famous for being in command of the Doolittle Raid and led carrier raids against Japanese forces in the weeks after Pearl Harbour. When morale is low, early successes, even small ones make a huge difference, and Halsey came to epitomise America’s fight against Japan.

But this wasn’t 1942 or 1943 when the war’s outcome was in doubt. But this was 1945. MacArthur was on his way to capturing the Philippines, and the Navy was poised to invade the Japanese island of Iwo Jima. There was no doubt that the US would triumph. What remained was how many would die before Japan’s surrender. That is to say that court martialling Halsey would not have affected the outcome.

While Halsey was in command of the Third Fleet, Admiral Raymond Spruance was in command of the Fifth Fleet. These fleets were comprised of the same ships, the only difference being those in charge. While Halsey was out conducting operations, Spruance was back at base planning future operations. At the end of January 1945, Spruance took over command of the fleet, with Halsey not returning until May.

Was Halsey at fault for the losses that resulted from Typhoon Cobra? You bet he was. But I can see why the Navies leadership and President Roosevelt did not want to remove him from command. It would have been a distraction, and nothing much would have changed either way. Like earlier controversies, the lessons learned were more important than assigning blame. But still, his failure to act cost the lives of almost 800 people, and he should have been held accountable.

Bibliography

Borneman, W. R. (2013). The Admirals: Nimitz, Halsey, Leahy, and King – The Five-Star Admirals Who Won the War at Sea (1st ed.): Back Bay.

Potter, E. B. (2008). Nimitz. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press.

By Justin|2024-04-29T15:42:17+10:00March 17, 2021|History|0 Comments

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