The Court of Inquiry Over Typhoon Cobra

In an earlier post, I detailed the events of December 1944 when Typhoon Cobra struck the Third Fleet. At the end, I said the tale of the investigation was a story for another time. Well, another time is today.

The Third Fleet arrived back at Ulithi on December 24 to regroup and repair. Within hours, Admiral Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific fleet, arrived at Ulithi. The following day, he sat down with Halsey and ordered a court of inquiry into the loss of the destroyers, and the damage sustained by the fleet. Typhoon Cobra had been one of the Navies greatest disasters, and they were determined to find out what went wrong. If required, the court of inquiry could recommend courts-martial for those who failed in the discharge of their duties. And no one within the Third Fleet’s chain of command would be safe, including Halsey.

The court of inquiry called all relevant officers to give evidence. This included the Chief Aerologist George Kosco, Task Force 38 commander John McCain, Task Group 38.2 commander Gerald Bogan as well as Halsey himself. Halsey would shift blame to the ‘non-existent’ weather warning systems of the Pacific. But two questions later, Halsey gave an answer that suggested he did receive at least some weather information. He would continue to maintain he had no warning of the storm’s approach.

Calling weather information hit or miss is an understatement. It was patchy and often inconsistent. But Halsey’s claims flew in the face of evidence provided by others in Third Fleet. It also contradicted his statements. On December 17, when the Spence was attempting to refuel from the New Jersey, Halsey believed that “we were on the fringes of a disturbance.” By the morning of the 18th, there was no doubt that a major storm was approaching, and he had to act.

But he didn’t do anything. He failed to issue a simple advisory to the ships under his command that the storm was much closer than previously thought. Halsey was in his early 60s and an experienced naval officer. In contrast, Henry Plage, in command of the USS Tabberer, was only 29. Halsey did not take into account that those under him were less experienced and in much smaller ships.

Ultimately, the court of inquiry found that Halsey was accountable for “errors of judgment”. He was “at fault in not broadcasting definite danger warnings to all vessels early morning of December 18 in order that preparations might be made as practicable and that inexperienced commanding officers might have sooner realized the seriousness of their situations.”

Sounds damning, and at least in my opinion, worthy of a charge of dereliction of duty. The court of inquiry found Halsey accountable, but instead of recommending charges, the court said that Halsey’s failure to act was due to the stress of war operations and were not offences.

Admiral Nimitz approved of the court’s findings and softened the indictment against Halsey by stating his firm opinion “that no question of negligence is involved.” He affirmed that Halsey’s errors of judgment were “committed under the stress of war operations” and were born “from a commendable desire to meet military commitments.”

Any condemnation by Admiral Nimitz was blamed on the Fleet’s over-reliance on new technologies rather than trusting their instincts. Nimitz found fault with both commanders and aerologists who placed too high importance on weather reports and other outside sources of information. Nimitz lectured “for a revival of the age-old habits of self-reliance and caution in regard to the hazard from storms, and for officers in all echelons of command to take their personal responsibilities in this respect more seriously.”

Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Ernest J. King softened the Navies indictment of Halsey further. He wrote “resulting from insufficient information” after “errors of judgment” and changed Nimitz’s “commendable desire” to “firm determination”.

Halsey was saved, and he knew it. It was too late in the war for the Navy to jettison its most famous Admiral. Whether this was the right thing or not is debatable. Halsey was famous for being in command of the Doolittle Raid and led carrier raids against Japanese forces in the weeks after Pearl Harbour. When morale is low, early successes, even small ones make a huge difference, and Halsey came to epitomise America’s fight against Japan.

But this wasn’t 1942 or 1943 when the war’s outcome was in doubt. But this was 1945. MacArthur was on his way to capturing the Philippines, and the Navy was poised to invade the Japanese island of Iwo Jima. There was no doubt that the US would triumph. What remained was how many would die before Japan’s surrender. That is to say that court martialling Halsey would not have affected the outcome.

While Halsey was in command of the Third Fleet, Admiral Raymond Spruance was in command of the Fifth Fleet. These fleets were comprised of the same ships, the only difference being those in charge. While Halsey was out conducting operations, Spruance was back at base planning future operations. At the end of January 1945, Spruance took over command of the fleet, with Halsey not returning until May.

Was Halsey at fault for the losses that resulted from Typhoon Cobra? You bet he was. But I can see why the Navies leadership and President Roosevelt did not want to remove him from command. It would have been a distraction, and nothing much would have changed either way. Like earlier controversies, the lessons learned were more important than assigning blame. But still, his failure to act cost the lives of almost 800 people, and he should have been held accountable.

Bibliography

Borneman, W. R. (2013). The Admirals: Nimitz, Halsey, Leahy, and King – The Five-Star Admirals Who Won the War at Sea (1st ed.): Back Bay.

Potter, E. B. (2008). Nimitz. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press.

By Justin|March 17, 2021|

The Value of Second Chances

Born in February 1885, Chester W. Nimitz lived in the small Texas town of Kerrville. His mother and stepfather managed the St. Charles Hotel. A young Chester would work at the hotel before and after school. In the summer of 1900, two graduates from Westpoint, the US Military Academy, visited the hotel. This was nothing unusual. Chester would see Army officers often. But what struck him was how close these men were to his age. When Chester compared their worldly appearance and sharp uniforms to his dreary work in the hotel, he despaired for his own prospects. He decided then to take the entrance exam for Westpoint.

Admission to the US service academies is a little unusual. Each member of Congress is issued five slots. They can either offer one of these to a constituent, the child of an active-duty officer, or they are apportioned by a competitive process. For the sake of brevity, I know this is greatly simplified. Chester visited his Congressman to seek admission to Westpoint, but there were no available slots. His district contained several Army posts, so the queue for officers wanting admission for their sons was long.

His Congressman offered him an alternative. Because of the recent success in the Spanish-American war, he had a slot in 1901 for the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland. It meant a frenzied year of tutoring, but he won the Congressional appointment. He passed the entrance exam and was sworn in as a cadet on September 7, 1901.

We’ll skip ahead a few years to when Ensign Chester Nimitz was given his first command. It was the USS Decatur, a Bainbridge-class destroyer. Interestingly1, the Decatur was the first destroyer commissioned into the United States Navy. In 1908, Nimitz and the Decatur were in the South China Sea en route to Manila when they entered a typhoon. Nimitz thought the vessel would break apart under him as the ship rolled 50 degrees. They made it to the other side and entered Manila harbour only a few hours behind schedule.

On July 7 of that year, the Decatur was entering Batangas Harbour, located south of Manila. Charts for the harbour were suspect, and standard naval procedure was to take bearings from landmarks to confirm your position. Ensign Nimitz chose instead to estimate his position. All was going well until one of his crew yelled out, “We’re not moving, sir!”. Ensign Nimitz had committed an unpardonable navy sin. The Decatur had run aground on a mudflat.

He attempted to reverse course, but as the deck shuddered beneath him, the Decatur did not move. Nor did it as he attempted to steer to port and then starboard. The ship was not going anywhere on its own. With nothing else to do until morning, Nimitz did the only thing that made sense to him. He posted the usual watches and recalled the advice of his grandfather who told him not to sweat the things he has no control over. He set up a cot on the deck and went to sleep.

The next morning, a passing steamer threw a line to the Decatur and pulled it off the mudflat. A more dishonest officer might have omitted this from his official reports, but Nimitz felt compelled to report the grounding to his superiors. An investigation removed him from command, and he was court-martialled for ‘culpable inefficiency in the performance of duty’.

His willingness to admit fault and his spotless record spoke to his quality as an officer. The lack of information in the charts for Batangas Harbour was also a mitigating factor. He was found guilty of the lesser charge of ‘neglect of duty’. His only punishment was a letter of reprimand.

If this happened in today’s Navy, Ensign Nimitz would have almost certainly been pushed out, or at least off the fast track for promotion. It is doubtful if he would have been offered another command and likely would have retired a junior officer. Today’s Navy is too risk-averse. Young officers are not encouraged to take – and learn from – calculated risks.

It may have had some impact on his career. After the court-martial, he was sent home from the far-east for reassignment. His prior experience should have meant a position on one of the larger surface ships in the Navy. But instead, he was assigned to submarines. At this time, submarines were a platform under active development and were not considered a worthwhile assignment. They were ungainly and unpopular. There is no evidence that the Decatur incident was the reason for this new assignment, but it is possible it was an informal punishment.

As with everything else he did, Ensign Nimitz threw himself into this new job and excelled. I won’t go into detail about the next few steps in Chester’s naval career, but on December 7, 1941, the day the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour, now Rear Admiral Nimitz was in charge of the Bureau of Navigation. ‘BuNav’ was the Navies personnel department; they ensured that each ship and shore establishment had the correct number of officers and sailors with the right mix of skills. It was one of the most important and senior staff positions in the Navy.

As the shock from the Japanese surprise attack reverberated from Pearl Harbour all the way to Washington, President Franklin Roosevelt appointed Nimitz as the new Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet. By the end of 1941, he received his promotion to full Admiral.

He ran US Pacific strategy from his office in Pearl Harbour and was pivotal to its victorious outcome. He was promoted to the new rank of Fleet Admiral in December 1944, one of only four US Navy officers ever to hold that rank. He signed the Japanese instrument of surrender representing the United States in 1945 and would go on to lead the post-war Navy as Chief of Naval Operations.

Perhaps Admiral Nimitz’s most enduring legacy is his support of then-Captain Hyman Rickover’s controversial 1947 proposal to build the submarine USS Nautilus, the world’s first nuclear-powered vessel. Admiral Rickover would go on to be the ‘father of the nuclear navy’, and nuclear power would form the core of many nations submarine fleets.

So, what can we learn from this story? A mistake made out of youth or inexperience can and should be forgiven. One mistake should not define you. I know there are always exceptions but imagine the implications if Admiral Nimitz was not overseeing the Pacific war or if no one listened to Rickover’s proposal. He committed an unpardonable navy sin, yet his superiors saw something in him and chose to give him a second chance, and it’s a good thing they did.

Bibliography

Borneman, W. R. (2013). The Admirals: Nimitz, Halsey, Leahy, and King – The Five-Star Admirals Who Won the War at Sea (1st ed.): Back Bay.

Potter, E. B. (2008). Nimitz. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press.

Slavin, E. (16/05/2010). How would Admiral Nimitz have been dealt with in today’s Navy? Retrieved from https://www.stripes.com/news/how-would-admiral-nimitz-have-been-dealt-with-in-today-s-navy-1.102689

By Justin|March 9, 2021|

Typhoon Cobra – Halsey’s Greatest Mistake

Prelude to the storm

During the Philippines campaign, the US Navies Third Fleet was the principal naval strike force of the Pacific theatre. Commanded by Admiral Bill Halsey, it was huge, comprising almost 200 warships and support ships.

In December 1944, the fleet’s mission was to aid General Douglas MacArthur in the Philippines. With the Third Fleet due off Luzon on the 19th, Halsey ordered the fleet 300km west to refuel.

By this time, the weather was beginning to turn. In those days, typhoon tracking was an imprecise science. Especially in the vastness of the Pacific. Incomplete weather reports in hand, fleet chief Aerologist Commander George Kosco became concerned.

As refuelling got underway, Fletcher-class destroyer USS Spence came alongside the Iowa-class battleship and Halsey’s flagship, USS New Jersey. The fleet’s smaller ships required frequent refuelling and with a storm brewing, they urgently needed topping up.

The wind and waves battered the Spence as it struggled to hold position. The ship yawed sharply to starboard before swinging back, only narrowly avoiding a collision with the far larger New Jersey. Halsey instinctively ducked as the Spence’s mast came within metres of striking him. Following similar reports throughout the fleet, Admiral Halsey abandoned refuelling. He set a rendezvous for 6 am the following morning 240km to the northwest to try again.

Kosco’s best guess placed the storm 700km away to the southeast moving to the north-northeast. But this proved to be a costly error. In reality, the storm was stalking the fleet less than 200km away.

There were those in the fleet who questioned Halsey’s sense of the weather. Captain Jasper Acuff commanded the fleet services group of oilers and support ships. He conversed with the captains of two accompanying ships, who all agreed that they were heading into a building typhoon. Rear Admiral Gerald Bogan, commander of Task Group 38.2 also believed a typhoon was pursuing them.

But why did these officers not pass on their findings? Halsey was one of the most respected fighting admirals in the US Navy. He became a legend following the Doolittle Raid in 1942 and his innate seamanship was well known. In 1914, a then Lieutenant Commander Halsey was in command of the destroyer USS Jarvis. As the Jarvis travelled at speed through dense fog, Halsey abruptly ordered the ship full speed astern. After the Jarvis came to a stop, a nearby fishing boat advised him that the ship was only a few hundred metres from running aground. The theory is that his subordinates assumed he either possessed better information or a better sense of the weather. Both of these assumptions were wrong.

As the weather continued to degrade on the evening of the 17th, Halsey ordered another refuelling rendezvous to the south. Kosco advised Halsey that this might put them in the storm’s path, and shortly after 10 pm, a final rendezvous was set. There was no consensus for where the storm was, and this affected the fleet’s decision-making capacity.

Halsey asked a subordinate, Admiral John McCain, his opinion. McCain only said that current conditions were too dangerous for refuelling.

The Fleet Battered

By 5 am on the 18th, the storm was only 140km south-southeast of the New Jersey. Halsey ordered all ships due south in an attempt to evade the storm, but it was too late. At 8 am, McCain, with Halsey’s agreement, ordered the fleet to the northeast. This only kept the fleet within the storm’s sights. By the time McCain ordered all ships to sail at will, the storm was already lashing the fleet. By midday, Halsey could not see the bow of the 50,000 ton New Jersey only 100 metres from the ship’s bridge.

For ships such as the Spence that only displaced 2000 tons, it was a terrifying experience. At about 11 am, 20-metre swells jammed the Spence’s rudder, and water damaged the ship’s electronics and pumps. After a continuous battering, the ship rolled 72 degrees to port and capsized. Of the ship’s complement of 336 men, only 24 survived.

Unfortunately, two other destroyers shared Spence’s fate. USS Hull and USS Monaghan also capsized as they battled the storm. Hull lost 202 of its complement of 265, and Monaghan lost 94 of its 100 crew. Stories from the survivors were like those from the Spence. Inundation and monster swells overwhelmed the ships.

The damage was extensive across the entire fleet. Especially on the top-heavy escort and light carriers. The Independence-class USS Monterey was almost lost when loose aircraft on the hangar deck ignited a ferocious fire. Fire is the single biggest threat on board a warship, made even more dangerous by the conditions. During the storm, the Monterey lost three crew and 18 aircraft destroyed by fire or blown overboard, with a further 16 damaged.

As an interesting ‘what might have been’, a young officer on the Monterey tasked with assessing the fire was almost swept overboard. That young officer was Lieutenant Commander Gerald Ford. Future US President and namesake for the Navies new class of aircraft carriers.

Other Independence-class carriers suffered a frightful toll during the storm. The USS Langley rolled through 70 degrees but somehow did not capsize. USS Cowpens lost one sailor overboard and eight aircraft.

Almost no ship escaped undamaged, with most losing aircraft, masts and/or antennae. But it could have been much worse. The fleet looked like it had fought a major engagement with the Japanese, not encountered a typhoon.

Aftermath

Rescue efforts began while the storm raged. The destroyer escort USS Tabberer and its skipper, Henry Lee Plage picked up its first survivor in the early hours of the 18th. It was itself fighting a desperate battle for survival. The Tabberer would pluck 55 men of the Hull and Spence from the water over 51 hours. Plage sent the following memorandum to the Tabberer’s crew.

As you all know, we have just been through quite an experience. We were in the middle of the most severe type of storm there is a tropical typhoon that came up without warning. We were lucky to escape with our lives. The only reason we pulled through was that God was looking out for the old “Tabby”.

Every man on board showed a wonderful spirit during the storm. No group of men could have worked harder under trying and dangerous circumstances then you men did.

The forty hours following the storm doubly proved what you men are made of. Most of you went for a total of three days and two night without sleep or rest. I honestly don’t think you would have slept for a week if we had stayed in the area looking for just one man. Through your efforts, we saved the lives of forty-one men from the U.S.S HULL (DD 350) and fourteen men from the U.S.S SPENCE (DD 512), a total of fifty-five men.

Halsey awarded Plage a Legion of Merit when he arrived at the US Navies forward operating base on Ulithi. The Tabberer’s crew received the Navy Unit Commendation.

All told, the storm killed 790 men, most from the three destroyers, Spence, Hull and Monaghan. Losses were also extensive amongst the fleet’s air wings. The storm destroyed up to 150 aircraft. More than had been lost in the Battle of the Philippine Sea in June of that year. It was one of the deadliest disasters to befall the US Navy since the Battle of Savo Island in 1942.

After the storm abated, the Third Fleet attempted to meet its obligations on Luzon, but the damage was too severe. Halsey ordered the fleet back to Ulithi to repair and regroup.

Pacific commander Admiral Nimitz convened a Board of Inquiry to investigate. There were a lot of questions. How did Halsey and Kosco miscalculate the weather so badly? What steps could commanders take to prevent a similar disaster in the future? Was someone at fault? But that’s a story for another time.

Bibliography

Borneman, W. R. (2013). The Admirals: Nimitz, Halsey, Leahy, and King – The Five-Star Admirals Who Won the War at Sea (1st ed.): Back Bay.

Erwin, S. J. (2004). TRAPPED IN A TYPHOON. Naval history, 18(6), 50.

Sheldon, M. L. (2004). Revisiting Typhoon Central. Naval history, 18(6), 53.

Smith, S. T. (2019). INTO THE STORM: Two ships and their captains battle fate in the grip of an infamous typhoon.(USS Tabberer and USS Hull facing Typhoon Cobra in the Philippine Sea in December 1944). World war II, 33(6), 48.

Tarter, S. (2002). A force of nature. American history, 37(4), 56.

Thompson, W., Jr. (2008). Battling the Pacific’s Most Deadly Force. Naval history, 22(5), 16.

By Justin|March 3, 2021|