Of course the US and China are not destined for war
I am an avid reader of the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s online publication, The Strategist. Most days, they release articles from a variety of authors on issues related to current events and items of strategic interest. Today, they posted an article by General Charles C. Krulak, USMC, Retired and Alex Friedman, former CFO at the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation titled ‘The US and China are not destined for war’.
It was an interesting, if obvious article that despite the predictions of war between these two great powers, it is not a forgone conclusion. The article mentions Graham Allison’s ‘Thucydides Trap’ discussed in his book Destined for War: Can America and China escape Thucydides’ Trap?. The basic idea is that when a great power meets a rising power, most times throughout human history, such clashes have ended in war. It can be read as alarmist in nature, but the whole point about defence and foreign policy thinkers is not necessarily to solve the issues of today, but to predict what could happen tomorrow. Before World War 2, the US military had secret war plans for any number of possibilities. Not merely for the obvious targets Germany or Japan, but also Great Britain. It’s called War Plan Red if you’re interested. You must be prepared for any eventuality, lest you be caught wrong footed when a crisis hits.
And there is no doubt that China has grown increasingly belligerent. Despite a momentary hiccup due to COVID-19, China appears to be powering ahead while the Western democracies continue to be mired in pandering to the political extremes of their populations and making a mess of pandemic response. China can build a skyscraper or a bridge in days, meanwhile it can take us literally years to accomplish the same task. China has been caught red-handed buying political influence in Australia and militarising their artificial islands in the Spratly and Paracel Islands. They are not a benign threat.
Do I think that the US and China will go to war? No, almost certainly not. For reasons mentioned in the article, China plays a long game and will not seek to risk all that they have gained by acting hasty. But at the same time, it is possible. How many wars have begun by miscalculation or mistake? Not all wars are launched through malevolent intent. And we need people like Graham Allison to see where the potential hot spots are so that we can prepare for them. It is the only prudent and responsible thing to do.
Afghanistan and the role of the United States in a bipolar world
As we all watch scenes of chaos unfold in Afghanistan, I can imagine that there are a great many people in China greedily rubbing their hands together over the whole affair. Once again, the United States has left an ally hanging. It is more evidence that the United States is an unreliable and alarmingly unpredictable ally. That ultimately, US foreign policy is at the mercy of a wilfully misinformed American public. As Tom Nichols said in a recent article for The Atlantic:
Americans will now exercise their usual partisan outrage for a few weeks, and then Afghanistan, like everything else in a nation with an attention span not much longer than a fast-food commercial, will be forgotten. In the meantime, American citizens will separate into their usual camps and identify all of the obvious causes and culprits except for one: themselves.
I remember being utterly shocked at the images of people falling to their deaths out of the World Trade Centre towers on September 11, and the world could only watch on as a similar tragedy unfolded over the past few days. Most people accept that we have entered a new era of great power competition. But how can America’s allies have any faith that they will act to meet a common threat when this is how they treat an ally? How can anyone trust that US politicians will do the right thing, even against opposition at home? The days of Presidents like Eisenhower or Truman, people with the fortitude to do what needed to be done are long gone.
The fact is that the United States is untrustworthy. Perhaps the American people will once again wake up and accept their place in the world. Who knows? But can we honestly trust the common sense of a people who, with many months of widespread access to vaccines, still has barely 50% of its population fully vaccinated against COVID-19? Such is the spread of misinformation and distrust in their government.
For Australia, there is no choice. We must remain closely allied with the United States. We have seen all too well what happens when the CCP turns its gaze upon you. However, our obsession with interoperability must end. We are building an expensive – perhaps too expensive – boutique defence force that might well work as part of an allied coalition against a country barely able to defend itself but is almost completely incapable of defending Australia. It is called the Australian Defence Force after all. If the fundamental mission of the ADF is to defend this country, and it cannot now, nor into the future, then what benefit are we deriving from spending vast sums of money?
Why are we replacing modern M1 Abrams tanks with a slightly newer variant of the Abrams? Why are we swapping one armed reconnaissance helicopter for another? What is the point of investing all this money in the Australian Army for the defence of Australia? If a foreign invader were ever to gain a foothold on our shores, we could never hope to push them back into the sea. Our island is vast. Could we ever hope to promptly bring sufficient force to bear on an invader? I believe that is debatable. There is insufficient infrastructure investment in Australia’s north. If an invasion of our island is thwarted, it will be because of the Navy and Air Force, not the Army.
This whole episode reminds me of Hugh White’s book Defending Australia. I am not advocating his plan to rebuild the ADF, but a new direction is required. It is clear that the same old way of thinking that has served us since the 1970s is no longer to our strategic benefit. We now live in a world that Australia has not faced since the 1940s, a powerful Asian threat. That is what initiated our pivot to the United States; Australia recognised that the British Empire was incapable of protecting us. Can we afford to cling to alliances that may fall apart when the conflict starts to the exclusion of all else? A strategic change of this magnitude takes at least a generation to complete. Can we afford to wait any longer? I’ll end with the words of Winston Churchill:
I have, myself, full confidence that if all do their duty, if nothing is neglected, and if the best arrangements are made, as they are being made, we shall prove ourselves once again able to defend our Island home, to ride out the storm of war, and to outlive the menace of tyranny, if necessary for years, if necessary alone.
Folly in Compulsory Voting?
Australia has compulsory voting for elections at all levels of government. But should it? For a long time, I felt we should not, but I’ve come to change my mind. There are many valid arguments for and against compulsory voting, so why do I support it?
One of the most ridiculous arguments against compulsory voting is that it is a step towards totalitarianism. Countries like Australia are not like Nazi Germany. After the 1938 Anschluss with Germany, the Nazis held a referendum in Austria over the issue. The ballot paper featured a large circle to approve of the Anschluss, and a small circle to vote no. It’s a not-so-subtle hint. Finally, you had to vote in front of campaign workers to ensure that you voted the correct way. The result was 99.71% voter turnout with ‘yes’ winning 99.73% of the vote.
In Australia, you line up, and give your name to the poll worker who ticks you off the roll. You’re then given a ballot paper and head into a private booth to fill it out. Drop it in the secure box and you’re done. If you don’t like any of the candidates, you’re not forced to vote for anyone. You can draw penises on the ballot paper, and nothing will happen to you.
This leads to another common argument. Compulsory voting increases informal voting. The assumption is that if people are forced to vote, they are far more likely to spoil their vote by leaving it blank, defacing it or voting incorrectly. I will illustrate why I don’t believe this is the case with an example.
When a sitting member resigns from parliament in Australia, it causes a by-election. The winner of which takes that seat in parliament until the next election. These are often seen as an annoyance. Few like to vote at the best of times, but when you’re forced to vote out of turn, it is frustrating and a waste of a perfectly good Saturday. The worst of these is the by-election that takes place in a safe seat. The stakes are high if it is a hotly contested by-election, or if the government’s majority rests on the result. But when neither is the case, there is little enthusiasm.
This happened late last year in the federal division of Groom. In the 2019 federal election, the LNP candidate won Groom by 40 points, a clear victory. Of the 98,608 votes cast, 3160, or 3.2%, were informal, what Australians call spoiled ballots.
In the 2020 Groom by-election, the new LNP candidate won by 35 points, another clear victory. Surprisingly, of the 88,645 votes cast in the by-election, only 2,504 or 2.82% were informal. So, in a by-election with no drama over the winner, there were fewer informal votes than in the general election the year prior.
Now voter turnout for the Groom by-election was lower; 93.05% of those enrolled voted in 2019 versus 81.66% for the by-election. But reduced turnout doesn’t mean that the 11.39% who did not vote would have voted informally. It was a COVID year, and despite easy access to postal voting, a depressed turnout was likely.
But how do the informal voting figures from these two recent Australian elections compare to the United States? According to the US Election Administration and Voting Survey, total voter turnout in 2016 was 140,114,502. Of those, 33,378,450 voted absentee with 318,728 rejected – only 0.77%.
Now 3.2% is higher than 0.77% so you could argue that compulsory voting leads to higher numbers of informal votes. While this may be technically correct, it ignores the fact that greater voter turnout still gives a more representative result.
Just days before the 2016 Presidential election, total voter registration in the US stood at 200,081,377. This would have increased in the final weeks, but this is as good a number as any to illustrate the point. Based on the total voter turnout of 140,114,502, only 70.03% of people registered voted. By comparison, in the 2019 Australian federal election 91.89% of people voted.
While Trump’s win in 2016 wasn’t because of voter turnout, you can argue that compulsory voting might have changed the result.
Even the argument that voluntary voting makes parties try harder is false. All compulsory voting does is increase voter turnout. Parties still need to convince people to vote for them. Plus, it helps minor parties who don’t have wealthy backers to fund their campaigns.
While compulsory voting may do little to help voter apathy, at least it engages more people in the process. Voting is an essential part of citizenship. Choosing not to vote means you forfeit the right to complain when the government does something you disagree with.
There are simply no viable arguments against making voting compulsory. It isn’t the first step in totalitarianism. It isn’t infringing on your rights. It is ensuring that your voice is heard.
The Court of Inquiry Over Typhoon Cobra
In an earlier post, I detailed the events of December 1944 when Typhoon Cobra struck the Third Fleet. At the end, I said the tale of the investigation was a story for another time. Well, another time is today.
The Third Fleet arrived back at Ulithi on December 24 to regroup and repair. Within hours, Admiral Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific fleet, arrived at Ulithi. The following day, he sat down with Halsey and ordered a court of inquiry into the loss of the destroyers, and the damage sustained by the fleet. Typhoon Cobra had been one of the Navies greatest disasters, and they were determined to find out what went wrong. If required, the court of inquiry could recommend courts-martial for those who failed in the discharge of their duties. And no one within the Third Fleet’s chain of command would be safe, including Halsey.
The court of inquiry called all relevant officers to give evidence. This included the Chief Aerologist George Kosco, Task Force 38 commander John McCain, Task Group 38.2 commander Gerald Bogan as well as Halsey himself. Halsey would shift blame to the ‘non-existent’ weather warning systems of the Pacific. But two questions later, Halsey gave an answer that suggested he did receive at least some weather information. He would continue to maintain he had no warning of the storm’s approach.
USS Santa Fe
Calling weather information hit or miss is an understatement. It was patchy and often inconsistent. But Halsey’s claims flew in the face of evidence provided by others in Third Fleet. It also contradicted his statements. On December 17, when the Spence was attempting to refuel from the New Jersey, Halsey believed that “we were on the fringes of a disturbance.” By the morning of the 18th, there was no doubt that a major storm was approaching, and he had to act.
But he didn’t do anything. He failed to issue a simple advisory to the ships under his command that the storm was much closer than previously thought. Halsey was in his early 60s and an experienced naval officer. In contrast, Henry Plage, in command of the USS Tabberer, was only 29. Halsey did not take into account that those under him were less experienced and in much smaller ships.
Ultimately, the court of inquiry found that Halsey was accountable for “errors of judgment”. He was “at fault in not broadcasting definite danger warnings to all vessels early morning of December 18 in order that preparations might be made as practicable and that inexperienced commanding officers might have sooner realized the seriousness of their situations.”
Sounds damning, and at least in my opinion, worthy of a charge of dereliction of duty. The court of inquiry found Halsey accountable, but instead of recommending charges, the court said that Halsey’s failure to act was due to the stress of war operations and were not offences.
Admiral Nimitz approved of the court’s findings and softened the indictment against Halsey by stating his firm opinion “that no question of negligence is involved.” He affirmed that Halsey’s errors of judgment were “committed under the stress of war operations” and were born “from a commendable desire to meet military commitments.”
Any condemnation by Admiral Nimitz was blamed on the Fleet’s over-reliance on new technologies rather than trusting their instincts. Nimitz found fault with both commanders and aerologists who placed too high importance on weather reports and other outside sources of information. Nimitz lectured “for a revival of the age-old habits of self-reliance and caution in regard to the hazard from storms, and for officers in all echelons of command to take their personal responsibilities in this respect more seriously.”
Third Fleet Oiler
Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Ernest J. King softened the Navies indictment of Halsey further. He wrote “resulting from insufficient information” after “errors of judgment” and changed Nimitz’s “commendable desire” to “firm determination”.
Halsey was saved, and he knew it. It was too late in the war for the Navy to jettison its most famous Admiral. Whether this was the right thing or not is debatable. Halsey was famous for being in command of the Doolittle Raid and led carrier raids against Japanese forces in the weeks after Pearl Harbour. When morale is low, early successes, even small ones make a huge difference, and Halsey came to epitomise America’s fight against Japan.
But this wasn’t 1942 or 1943 when the war’s outcome was in doubt. But this was 1945. MacArthur was on his way to capturing the Philippines, and the Navy was poised to invade the Japanese island of Iwo Jima. There was no doubt that the US would triumph. What remained was how many would die before Japan’s surrender. That is to say that court martialling Halsey would not have affected the outcome.
While Halsey was in command of the Third Fleet, Admiral Raymond Spruance was in command of the Fifth Fleet. These fleets were comprised of the same ships, the only difference being those in charge. While Halsey was out conducting operations, Spruance was back at base planning future operations. At the end of January 1945, Spruance took over command of the fleet, with Halsey not returning until May.
Was Halsey at fault for the losses that resulted from Typhoon Cobra? You bet he was. But I can see why the Navies leadership and President Roosevelt did not want to remove him from command. It would have been a distraction, and nothing much would have changed either way. Like earlier controversies, the lessons learned were more important than assigning blame. But still, his failure to act cost the lives of almost 800 people, and he should have been held accountable.
Bibliography
Borneman, W. R. (2013). The Admirals: Nimitz, Halsey, Leahy, and King – The Five-Star Admirals Who Won the War at Sea (1st ed.): Back Bay.
Potter, E. B. (2008). Nimitz. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press.
The Obsession With Big Ships
South Korea has launched an indigenous aircraft carrier program named CVX. But the reasons for its existence appear flawed. What exactly is the purpose of this vessel? Is this really about countering the threat from China? A vanity exercise perhaps? Competition with Japan? The answer is in all those questions. But when discussing the investment required to build and operate an aircraft carrier, you would hope that those making the decisions have fully thought it through.
South Korea is one of the most militarised democratic states in the world, and with good reason. The Korean War began with a surprise attack by the North in the early hours of June 25, 1950. The North came perilously close to victory until a United Nations force led by the United States pushed them back. Ever since, South Korea has had to build its military to deal with a potential repeat performance by the North, and more recently, Chinese aggression. When dealing with South Korean foreign and defence policy, you also need to factor in Japan. Japan ruled the peninsula from 1910 until its defeat in 1945. This has left deep wounds that persist to this day.
So, what is behind South Korea’s decision to build a carrier? Strategic competition with China is certainly one interpretation. China has been rapidly expanding its fleet over the past decade. At this pace, they could match the US Navy globally by 2030, maybe even earlier. They currently have two carriers in commission with two more under construction. They have demonstrated a rapid ability to develop not just a carrier, but also operate it. A carrier is useless unless you know how to use it effectively.
The Korean CVX should be large enough to embark 20 F-35Bs; a useful strike force, but limited. The combat range of the F-35B is only 833km. South Korea is only 300-600km from mainland China. Well within the combat radius of Chinese bombers and fighters. If it sat in the Sea of Japan, it could just reach the Chinese mainland.
It would also be useless for defending the South Korean homeland. Their Air Force and other surface ships would be far more effective weapons for home defence. If it strays too far away from friendly bases, it would be at the mercy of the much larger and potent Chinese fleet. And that is ignoring the many Chinese missiles arrayed along their coast.
It would also be of no use against North Korea. Its Navy is small and could be dealt with by other assets. Shore-based aircraft could reach every part of the North. Even if they had to loop around the Yellow Sea or the Sea of Japan to get there.
A graphical representation of the combat radius of the F-35B
In the above image, the white circles represent the combat radius of the F-35B. In each case, the Chinese could strike at it from its mainland bases. A South Korean carrier could never get close enough to China to be any real threat. And even if it could, what would it hit? China is huge, and its military bases are scattered all over the country. You could never hope to destroy even a fraction of them. Aerial refuelling would expand this range, but that works both ways. What increases the range for Korea will also do so for China.
Clouding the situation is the plan for Japan to convert the two Izumo-class helicopter destroyers into aircraft carriers. The first Japanese carriers since World War 2. Japan is also buying 42 F-35Bs to fly from them. On one side, you have a competition between South Korea and Japan. Neither wants to be outdone or left behind. On the other, you have Koreans holding on to the scars of its treatment by the Japanese. They see Japan with a large and capable Navy and now with a carrier component, and fear their power.
The Izumo-class helicopter destroyer
So, what is the point of the CVX? To me, it appears to be, at least in part, a vanity exercise. The South Korean Navy wants the prestige that comes from operating a carrier. There is nothing that Admirals love more than aircraft carriers. They have been a symbol of power and prestige ever since World War 2.
They certainly wouldn’t be the first nation to build a vanity carrier. Thailand bought the HTMS Chakri Naruebet back in the 90s, but a funding shortfall has meant that the carrier rarely embarks fixed-wing aircraft and seldom leaves port. Derisively nicknamed the ‘Thai-tanic’ by local media, the vessel is too small to be an effective carrier and is a white elephant.
The Thai HTMS Chakri Naruebet
I get it. I love cruisers and destroyers. But it is the immense size and strength of the carrier that floats my boat. But with rapidly increasing costs, you have to carefully evaluate whether it is worth it when compared to what else you could buy with that money. The South Korean defence ministry estimates acquisition costs of 2.03 trillion won for the carrier; about $1.8 billion.
Even assuming that is close to the final bill which seems unlikely, that does not include the ships air wing. In current dollars, each F-35B will cost roughly $100 million to buy, and a further $352 million to operate over its life. And that does not include the helicopter component of its air wing, which adds another $1 billion to the acquisition bill. Multiply that by 20, and you get a cost of over $9 billion for the F-35Bs alone. You can spend $1 million a day operating a ship the size of an aircraft carrier, and they can remain in service for 50 years.
Adding all this together, South Korea is committing itself to spend at least $18.25 billion. And that assumes the F-35B remains in service for the life of the carrier. If they chose to replace the air wing halfway through the carrier’s life, that price tag increases to $27.25 billion, a massive amount of money. The South Korean defence budget for 2021 is only $46.7 billion. The costs are spread over a significant period, but that ignores the fact that you’re allocating a significant percentage of your defence budget to a vulnerable platform. Especially when that platform serves little strategic purpose.
By comparison, and only factoring the acquisition cost of $5 billion, South Korea could instead buy:
- 17 of the more capable F-35As,
- 2 Sejong the Great-class destroyers, and
- 2 Dosan Ahn Changho-class submarines
A far more potent force than a single light carrier and its air wing.
A cut away of the Canberra-class LHD showing the hangar and well decks
The absence of a well deck also limits the carrier’s utility. Without a well deck, it cannot embark amphibious vehicles or landing craft. It also restricts its ability to provide humanitarian relief. Ships like the Australian Canberra-class LHDs can deploy 1000 troops via helicopters and landing craft. Because of this, ships of this type often possess better than average medical facilities with operating theatres, labs, blood banks and wards. This is especially vital when used for disaster relief.
To be fair, carriers without well decks are far from useless; they are potent instruments of the state. Carriers are strategic weapons designed to project power. Other missions can be accomplished more efficiently with smaller and cheaper vessels. I simply do not see the value in an Asian nation building a single dedicated aircraft carrier of this size and South Korea can’t afford more than one. The security environment is too contested.
The only legitimate use for a South Korean carrier that I can see is to act as a small cog in a much larger Indo-Pacific military alliance. Similar to how European navies operated with the US Navy during the Cold War. French and British carriers were small but were valuable when integrated into a NATO strike force. But is this something that South Korean Admirals are considering? Only they can answer that.
The Value of Second Chances
Born in February 1885, Chester W. Nimitz lived in the small Texas town of Kerrville. His mother and stepfather managed the St. Charles Hotel. A young Chester would work at the hotel before and after school. In the summer of 1900, two graduates from Westpoint, the US Military Academy, visited the hotel. This was nothing unusual. Chester would see Army officers often. But what struck him was how close these men were to his age. When Chester compared their worldly appearance and sharp uniforms to his dreary work in the hotel, he despaired for his own prospects. He decided then to take the entrance exam for Westpoint.
Admission to the US service academies is a little unusual. Each member of Congress is issued five slots. They can either offer one of these to a constituent, the child of an active-duty officer, or they are apportioned by a competitive process. For the sake of brevity, I know this is greatly simplified. Chester visited his Congressman to seek admission to Westpoint, but there were no available slots. His district contained several Army posts, so the queue for officers wanting admission for their sons was long.
His Congressman offered him an alternative. Because of the recent success in the Spanish-American war, he had a slot in 1901 for the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland. It meant a frenzied year of tutoring, but he won the Congressional appointment. He passed the entrance exam and was sworn in as a cadet on September 7, 1901.
Midshipman 1/C Nimitz
We’ll skip ahead a few years to when Ensign Chester Nimitz was given his first command. It was the USS Decatur, a Bainbridge-class destroyer. Interestingly1, the Decatur was the first destroyer commissioned into the United States Navy. In 1908, Nimitz and the Decatur were in the South China Sea en route to Manila when they entered a typhoon. Nimitz thought the vessel would break apart under him as the ship rolled 50 degrees. They made it to the other side and entered Manila harbour only a few hours behind schedule.
On July 7 of that year, the Decatur was entering Batangas Harbour, located south of Manila. Charts for the harbour were suspect, and standard naval procedure was to take bearings from landmarks to confirm your position. Ensign Nimitz chose instead to estimate his position. All was going well until one of his crew yelled out, “We’re not moving, sir!”. Ensign Nimitz had committed an unpardonable navy sin. The Decatur had run aground on a mudflat.
He attempted to reverse course, but as the deck shuddered beneath him, the Decatur did not move. Nor did it as he attempted to steer to port and then starboard. The ship was not going anywhere on its own. With nothing else to do until morning, Nimitz did the only thing that made sense to him. He posted the usual watches and recalled the advice of his grandfather who told him not to sweat the things he has no control over. He set up a cot on the deck and went to sleep.
The next morning, a passing steamer threw a line to the Decatur and pulled it off the mudflat. A more dishonest officer might have omitted this from his official reports, but Nimitz felt compelled to report the grounding to his superiors. An investigation removed him from command, and he was court-martialled for ‘culpable inefficiency in the performance of duty’.
USS Decatur
His willingness to admit fault and his spotless record spoke to his quality as an officer. The lack of information in the charts for Batangas Harbour was also a mitigating factor. He was found guilty of the lesser charge of ‘neglect of duty’. His only punishment was a letter of reprimand.
If this happened in today’s Navy, Ensign Nimitz would have almost certainly been pushed out, or at least off the fast track for promotion. It is doubtful if he would have been offered another command and likely would have retired a junior officer. Today’s Navy is too risk-averse. Young officers are not encouraged to take – and learn from – calculated risks.
It may have had some impact on his career. After the court-martial, he was sent home from the far-east for reassignment. His prior experience should have meant a position on one of the larger surface ships in the Navy. But instead, he was assigned to submarines. At this time, submarines were a platform under active development and were not considered a worthwhile assignment. They were ungainly and unpopular. There is no evidence that the Decatur incident was the reason for this new assignment, but it is possible it was an informal punishment.
As with everything else he did, Ensign Nimitz threw himself into this new job and excelled. I won’t go into detail about the next few steps in Chester’s naval career, but on December 7, 1941, the day the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbour, now Rear Admiral Nimitz was in charge of the Bureau of Navigation. ‘BuNav’ was the Navies personnel department; they ensured that each ship and shore establishment had the correct number of officers and sailors with the right mix of skills. It was one of the most important and senior staff positions in the Navy.
As the shock from the Japanese surprise attack reverberated from Pearl Harbour all the way to Washington, President Franklin Roosevelt appointed Nimitz as the new Commander-in-Chief of the United States Pacific Fleet. By the end of 1941, he received his promotion to full Admiral.
Admiral Nimitz giving Doris Miller his Navy Cross
He ran US Pacific strategy from his office in Pearl Harbour and was pivotal to its victorious outcome. He was promoted to the new rank of Fleet Admiral in December 1944, one of only four US Navy officers ever to hold that rank. He signed the Japanese instrument of surrender representing the United States in 1945 and would go on to lead the post-war Navy as Chief of Naval Operations.
Fleet Admiral Nimitz signing the instrument of surrender in Tokyo Bay, 1945
Perhaps Admiral Nimitz’s most enduring legacy is his support of then-Captain Hyman Rickover’s controversial 1947 proposal to build the submarine USS Nautilus, the world’s first nuclear-powered vessel. Admiral Rickover would go on to be the ‘father of the nuclear navy’, and nuclear power would form the core of many nations submarine fleets.
Admiral Rickover and President Kennedy, 1963
So, what can we learn from this story? A mistake made out of youth or inexperience can and should be forgiven. One mistake should not define you. I know there are always exceptions but imagine the implications if Admiral Nimitz was not overseeing the Pacific war or if no one listened to Rickover’s proposal. He committed an unpardonable navy sin, yet his superiors saw something in him and chose to give him a second chance, and it’s a good thing they did.
Bibliography
Borneman, W. R. (2013). The Admirals: Nimitz, Halsey, Leahy, and King – The Five-Star Admirals Who Won the War at Sea (1st ed.): Back Bay.
Potter, E. B. (2008). Nimitz. Annapolis: Naval Institute Press.
Slavin, E. (16/05/2010). How would Admiral Nimitz have been dealt with in today’s Navy? Retrieved from https://www.stripes.com/news/how-would-admiral-nimitz-have-been-dealt-with-in-today-s-navy-1.102689